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Non-technical summary
The tragedy of little Madeleine in 2007 did not only catch the headlines of the public media but was also followed with interest by researchers after the remarkably successful donation acquisition of the desperate parents. To nance a costly search for their taken daughter, they asked the British population for donations. Presumably unconsciously they beneted of the so called "identiable victim eect" because society is willing to spend far more money to save the lives of identiable victims than to save statistical victims (Jenny und Loewenstein, 1997) . In the literature this eect has up to now been investigated in laboratory experiments and in surveys. Studies indicate that identiable victims evoke more intense feelings than more inclusive ones. In our study we investigate the eect in a eld experimental setting and are especially focussing on measuring support in terms of monetary donations. For the experiment we cooperated with a German charitable organization which promotes primary medical health care in ve developing countries. Together with the organization we framed two versions of a solicitation letter that was sent to 57,325 households as part of the yearly winter mailing campaign. Within the "baseline"-group recipients were asked -as in previous mailings -to donate any desired amount to the organisation. Potential donors in the "choice"-group were beyond that given the possibility to select a particular country (or more countries) as donation recipient. In line with the eect of the identiable victim we expect higher donations when one explicit object of benevolence can be chosen for a donation. The reference group can thus be reduced from the whole population of ve countries to one particular country. Our hypothesis was that, although the victim is in this case not as identiable as in the case of Madeleine, this weak identiable victim eect could lead to higher donations. Overall, 6,709 study relevant donations were received by the organization in the observation period between December 3rd, 2007 and January 31st, 2008, adding up to an amount of more than 1 million Euro. The response rate was 11.7% for both groups. Within the "choice"-group, 3.4% of the donors made use of the selection possibility and donated to a particular country. Such donors donated with an average amount of 160 e signicantly more than those donors who did not select a country for their donation (135 e). The organisation additionally provided us with data of their two previous winter mailing campaigns that allowed us to observe the donation behaviour of households over time. Under inclusion of the donation history we deduced that households that donated to a particular country in 2007 did not donate dierently in previous years than did those donors who did not select any country for their donation in 2007. This supports our hypothesis that the dierent average amounts in 2007 stem from our treatment manipulation and not from random or selection biases. Our study emphasizes that charitable organisations can benet from giving donors more precise information of how the donated money will be used. The probable reason is that altruistic action seems to be mediated by aroused empathetic emotions. People give in order to do something good for the victims and/or themselves. But the intensity of the emotions which might be expressed by the height of the donation seems to depend on factors that can be inuenced, e.g. in terms of more detailed information with respect to the donation purpose. 1 The supported charitable organizations are, for various reasons, frequently rather specialized in their activities. For example, some support children, while others support elderly people, or medic programs in developing countries, or wildlife, etc. Even if the organization engages in more than one activity, the most common way to raise funds is to send solicitation letters that ask for donations to a single activity. Interestingly, however, the organizations usually do not discriminate with respect to the countries that the donors can support. In this paper, we shed light on the eect of providing donors with the possibility to choose the target country for their donations.
To study our research question, we conducted a randomized eld experiment. The Doctors for Developing Countries sent out more than 57,000 solicitation letters by mail in two dierent versions. In the one version, potential donors could donate to the organizations' main purpose only -the project work in ve dierent developing countries. The other version provided donors with the possibility to select one or more particular countries as donation recipients. The organization received 6,709 donations in total in response to the appeal for funds. We nd that, overall, 3.4% of all donors 1 source: Giving USA Foundation, Center on Philanthropy, Indiana University. 2 in the treatment group make use of the selection possibility. Those who use the option, i.e., who state a recipient for their donation, give signicantly more. On average, their donations are 18% higher. Furthermore, controlling for the donation activity of the two previous winter mailings indicates that this dierence indeed stems from our treatment manipulation and is unlikely to be a result of selection bias or chance.
The observation that many people prefer to share their donations equally among the target countries instead of choosing a single recipient might reect a reluctance to consider tradeos when those concern important,`protected' values (cp. Ritov and Baron (1999) ). Nevertheless, we nd that some donors do choose their object of benevolence and that their donation is signicantly above average. This result demonstrates that subjects' valuation can be higher for a subset than for a more inclusive target. A possible explanation might be that the less inclusive target evokes more intense feelings than the more inclusive one (cp. Kahneman and Ritov (1994) , Kogut and Ritov (2005) ); e.g., in our case it might be that a donor has more intense feelings towards a particular country, maybe because he has some specic link to it.
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This suggests that altruistic motivation seems to be mediated by aroused empathetic emotions (see also the empathy-altruism hypothesis by Batson et al. (1991) , or the evidence provided by Cialdini et al. (1987 ), Batson (1987 , or Batson and Coke (1981) ). This in turn might inform the economic literature trying to model altruism (e.g., Andreoni (1990) , Harbaugh (1998) , Ariely et al. (2009) ).
2 Take, for example, the case of saving human lives: would you like to decide between saving the life of n persons in Bangladesh or in Kenya? The answer is likely to depend on your attitude towards the two countries. Maybe your relatives live in Kenya or you had positive experiences during a visit to Kenya, in which case you might have stronger empathetic emotions and thus prefer to help people in Kenya and give more than if you had to share your donations between Bangladesh and Kenya.
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Our study is also closely related to the empirical research investigating the eects of identication on benevolence and helping behavior (e.g., Fetherstonhaugh et al. (1997) , Jenni and Loewenstein (1997) , Bohnet and Frey (1999) , Small and Loewenstein (2003) , Brosig et al. (2003) ). Starting with Schelling (1968) , these studies (backed up by casual empirical observations) support the idea that people care more about identiable, or`familiar', victims than about statistical victims. Several potential causes are recognized for inducing the identiable victim eect, e.g., vividness, uncertainty, or the proportion of the reference group that can be saved. Basically, however, the mediating factor behind the eect seems to be evoked emotions. Identiable victims evoke stronger emotional and moral reactions than (equivalent) unidentiable victims (cp. Kogut and Ritov (2005) , who nd that self-reported sympathy towards the victim and willingness to help the victim are correlated). Our results point into the same direction, but the dierence is that the information set provided by us is kept constant between the two solicitation letters.
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge the existing evidence up to now either stems from questionnaire studies (e.g., Jenni and Loewenstein (1997)) or from the lab (e.g., Güth et al. (2007) , Andreoni and Petrie (2004) ), but not from a controlled eld experiment.
The observation that people sometimes act as if the whole is less than the sum of its parts (VanBoven and Epley (2003)) has also been made in other domains, in particular in connection with contingent-valuation methods. It seems as if people are regularly prone to an`unpacking eect' (cp. Rottenstreich and Tversky (1997)) or a`part-whole bias' (cp. Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) , Diamond and Hausman (1994) , Bateman et al. (1997) ) when appraising events or evaluating categories.
3 We add to this literature by demon-3 For example, Kahneman and Ritov (1994) Method: We used the DfDC's winter mailing campaign 2007 for our eld ingness to pay to save a group of species (reptiles) in a given area is lower then for saving only a specic species (turtles) out of that group in the same area.
4 Otherwise, observing a donor choosing a particular country might also be due to a dierence in the charity's activities in that particular country. This, of course, might be interesting as well, but is beyond the scope of the present paper. In the baseline treatment, donors could not choose their donation recipient.
Instead as in the previous winter mailings each donation was equally split between the ve countries. In the choice treatment, donors could declare which country (or countries) should receive the donated amount; the default being to support all ve countries equally 6 . In both treatments, the solicitation letter included a cover letter and a single remittance slip which had the account and bank number pre-printed on it. The pre-printed account numbers diered between treatments so that we know for each donor his or her corresponding treatment.
The same cover letter was used in both treatments. It explained the project work of the organization during the last year and mentioned the ve countries for which they asked for donations in 2007. Thus, information about the countries provided by the experimenter were identical between treatments. The only dierence in the cover letter was that a section was added in treatment choice in which the choice-option was explained. Additionally, a second page was added where the procedure to donate to a specic country was explained in detail: By entering ve digit codes in the reference-eld on the remittance slip, subjects were able to pick any (combination) of the ve countries to donate to. If a single code was entered, the entire donated amount went to the recipient that the donor had selected. If more than one code was entered, the donated money was to be split equally between the selected countries. If no code was entered, the donation was treated as in treatment baseline, i.e. the allocation decision was left to the organization. other-regarding preferences are reference-group dependent (as it is the case in many economic models of social preferences, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) , Falk and Fischbacher (2006) ), or identiabilitybased as Bohnet and Frey (1999) call it, our treatment might aect donation behavior. Donors who have more intense feelings for any of the ve countries might be expected to prefer this country over the other four countries and consequently choose this particular country to be the donation recipient. One should therefore hypothesize donations to be higher in treatment choice than in baseline. Since donors in choice are not required to specify where their money will be used, the design of the treatment should not lower donation rates or donations of willing donors. On the contrary, it is imaginable that potential donors could be won by the fact that a higher decision scope is given which induces them to donate at all. Therefore, the response rate is expected to be higher when the object of benevolence can be chosen.
One can also view our treatments from the perspective of the literature on identiable victims. As donors in treatment choice have the opportunity to donate money to specic countries, this treatment can be seen as a selection process. By selecting particular countries as donation recipients, the donation cause is more`identiable' to these donors which in turn may induce them to donate higher amounts. Of course, victims are not as explicitly identied as it is usually the case in this area of research. Still, one could speak of a weak identiability eect, because the donor reduces the reference group from the whole population of ve countries to a particular country.
Results
In this section, we will rst look whether the response rate and the donated amounts dier between treatments. Subsequently, we will explore the behavior of the donors who state a specic donation recipient. As will be seen, Table 1 provides an overview of the donation behavior in the two treatments.
As can be seen, our data set includes 6,687 donation instances (observations).
7 In treatment baseline, 3166 instances were recorded, compared to 3521 donations in treatment choice. The response rate is almost identical in 7 We dropped 22 outliers from our dataset. These persons donated between 5,000 and 100,000e. Given the usual donation size, these are outstanding amounts; in particular when considering that the 99th percentile is`only' 1500e. Their inclusion does not change any of the reported signicance levels qualitatively, but they bias the reported means. We therefore believe that it is appropriate to drop them. Moreover, the treatment manipulation is unlikely to impact those donation decisions. In particular, in none of the 14 donations which are dropped in treatment choice a specic country was selected. Second, our ndings are of importance for the literature modeling altruistic preferences, or social preferences in general. They underline that such preferences are not necessarily generic but instead depend on the situation and persons at hand something which is taken into account in several models by using the concept of reference groups, but which is frequently neglected when using or talking about these models. For example, the models on altruism usually ignore that helping behavior is (at least partly) identiability-based.
It might be worthwhile to incorporate this fact in future models, and we hope that this helps to gain a better understanding of altruistic motivation and behavior.
Third, our result that subjects' valuation can be higher for a subset than for a more inclusive target might be of great interest to those who use contingent-valuation methods. Complementing the existing work in this area, we demonstrate that even in actual decision situations, people sometimes act as if their preferences were non-additive. Taking our ndings one step further, they might even be of interest for scholars working in the area of public nance.
For example, citizens' willingness to pay duties or taxes might increase if they were given the choice about what happens with their money afterwards. Of course, this implication is strongly hypothetical at the moment. Moreover, it runs counter the basic idea of funds provided by taxation being not targeted to a specic purpose or function. However, one might think about combining an uncommitted tax with a menu of committed duties on top of it to choose from. This promises to be an interesting application and eld for future research.
One last thing to point out is the timely aspect of the donation.
10 In all three years, we nd that most donations are made in the two subsequent weeks after donors received the appeal for funds. Interestingly, however, the average donation amount is highest in the time period between Christmas and New Year's Eve. In fact, it is about 60% higher than the donations received in the December and January weeks before and afterwards. While more research and experiments are needed to answer the question about causality here, still charities might think about focussing or increasing their eort to raise funds around the Christmas days to benet from this eect. Moreover, if we hypothesize that the increased donation size in this time period is due to people being in a more emotional condition during Christmas, this last nding further underlines the link between altruistic motivations and emotions.
10 Details are provided in the appendix.
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